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1. Introduction 
It is often argued that informed traders may take advantage of the high leverage in the options 
market to capitalize on their private information (Black (1975)). In addition, options can be 
used to trade on negative information in the presence of short-sale constraints on the 
underlying stocks. One seminal study by Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) proposes that 
options are preferred by informed traders when the implicit leverage is high and the options 
market is liquid. A recent stream of empirical papers documents the informational leading 
role of the options market relative to the stock market.1 For example, Pan and Poteshman 
(2006) show that the put to call trading volume ratio can negatively predict future stock 
returns. Cremers and Weinbaum (2010) show that the deviation from put-call parity reflects 
information about future stock price changes, and Xing, Zhang, and Zhao (2010) find that the 
firm-level options volatility skew can predict future cross-sectional equity returns. 
A separate stream of literature studies stock market trading patterns in the days before 
analyst news. Among others, Irvine, Lipson and Puckett (2007) report the abnormal trading 
volume of institutional investors before the upcoming initial buy recommendations of 
analysts, while Christophe, Ferri and Hsieh (2010) find abnormal short-selling activity before 
analyst downgrades. Both articles argue that analysts might tip certain groups of investors 
about the upcoming analyst news.2 
In this paper, we combine these two strands of the literature. If analysts indeed tip 
investors about upcoming analyst news, for the reasons discussed above, options markets 
1 See, for example, Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004); Ni, Pan, and Poteshman (2008); Roll, Schwartz, 
and Subrahmanyam (2010); and Johnson and So (2012). 
2 On the other hand, Blau and Wade (2012) argue that the abnormal short sales before analyst recommendations 
are speculative trades rather than informed trades based on tips from analysts. 
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might be the ideal place to exploit such information. We therefore study the patterns in 
options prices prior to analyst news events. First, we establish that options prices predict the 
stock market’s response to analyst news.3 Second, and most importantly, we distinguish 
between three potential explanations for this finding: tipping (from analysts to options 
traders), reverse tipping (from options traders to analysts), or common information (of 
analysts and options traders). As discussed below in detail, our results are most consistent 
with the tipping hypothesis.   
Our findings are related to those in two independent studies by Hayunga and Lung (2013) 
and Lung and Xu (2014). Hayunga and Lung (2013) show that options trading reflects 
information about analysts’ recommendation consensus changes. Lung and Xu (2014) show 
abnormal option trading activities before analyst initiations, and the authors relate this pattern 
to analyst tipping. We differ from these two papers in several key aspects: First, we conduct a 
more comprehensive analysis of the channel through which the lead-lag correlation between 
informed options trading measures and analyst-related news can be manifested. We exclude a 
third possible channel, i.e., the common-information channel, which is neglected by Hayunga 
and Lung (2013). Second, we have a more complete sample of analyst-related events as a 
result of including the analyst forecast revision in the analysis. Third, we decompose the 
predictability of options trading on stock returns regarding days with specified analyst-related 
events and other days. Last but not least, we have a better execution of the estimated standard 
errors in the pooled OLS regressions. We double-cluster the estimated standard errors along 
3 Analyst-related events have been shown to contain new information that moves the stock price. See, for 
example, Womack (1996); Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2001); and Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and 
Lee (2004). 
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both firm and time dimensions.  
Our paper also makes contributions to the literature by settling the debate on whether the 
options market leads the stock market in the price-discovery process. Many papers have 
linked the informed options trading and lead-lag relation between the option and stock 
markets to corporate events, such as earnings announcements (Xing, Zhang, and Zhao (2010); 
Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2010); Jin, Livnat, and Zhang (2012); and Johnson and 
So (2012)), mergers and acquisitions (Cao, Chen, and Griffin (2005); and Chan, Ge, and Lin 
(2013)), and bankruptcy (Ge, Humphery-Jenner, and Lin (2013)). However, there are other 
studies arguing that options do not contribute to the equity price discovery process. Chan, 
Chung, and Fong (2002) show that stock net trading volume can predict future options quotes 
revisions, but not vice versa. Their results suggest that informed investors only initiate their 
trades in the stock market. Muravyev, Pearson, and Broussard (2013) find that options quotes 
do not contain any non-public information about future underlying stock prices, and it is the 
stock price that leads the options quotes in the price discovery process. 
Empirical, our analysis focuses on three analyst news events: the analyst recommendation 
change, the analyst forecast revision, and the analyst initiation of coverage. We employ two 
proxies for the options trading activities of informed traders based on previous studies, the 
implied volatility (IV) spread (Cremers and Weinbaum (2010)) and the IV skew (Xing, Zhang, 
and Zhao (2010)). The IV spread, which is the difference in IVs between matched pairs of 
call and put options with identical strike prices and maturities, has been demonstrated to be a 
positive predictor of equity returns. 4 On the other hand, the IV skew, defined as the 
4 See, for example, Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2004); Bali and Hovakimian (2009); and Cremers and 
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difference between the IVs of out-of-the-money (OTM) put options and at-the-money (ATM) 
call options, is shown to be negatively associated with future stock returns.5 Intuitively, if 
informed traders anticipate a drop in the stock price, they are more likely to buy put options 
to capitalize on their private information, especially OTM puts. In a market that is not 
perfectly liquid, this will lead to a price increase in those put options, resulting in a decrease 
of the IV spread and an increase of the IV skew, and vice versa.  
Using options pricing data and analyst-related news data from January 1996 to December 
2010, we first perform regressions of stock returns on each informed options trading proxy. 
Consistent with the results of previous studies, we document that the IV spread (IV skew) 
carries significantly positive (negative) information for future excess returns. Firms with 
lower IV spreads or higher IV skews experience lower stock returns in the following week. 
We then add interaction terms with dummy variables indicating days with the three 
analyst-related events and calculate the proportion of the predictability of options trading on 
excess returns that is associated with the events. We find that 10.74% (13.20%) of the 
predictability of the IV spread (IV skew) comes from the days with analyst recommendation 
changes, analyst forecast revisions, and analyst initiation of coverage. Because the event days 
constitute only 4.47% (5.26%) of the IV spread (IV skew) sample, the predictive power of the 
IV spread and skew more than doubles on analyst-related news days compared with no 
analyst-related news days. Nevertheless, a large part of the predictability is obtained on other 
days, which shows that options traders have information that goes beyond the analyst-related 
events that we study.  
Weinbaum (2010). 
5 See, for example, Bates (1991); Bollen and Whaley (2004); and Xing, Zhang, and Zhao (2010). 
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We then turn to the main contribution of the paper, that is, our study of the interplay 
between analysts and option traders in more detail. We discuss three hypotheses that might 
explain this correlation. First, analysts could inform options traders about their upcoming 
recommendation change, earnings forecast revision, or initiation coverage (“analyst tipping”). 
Second, options traders could leak their trading information to analysts, leading to 
recommendation changes or forecast revisions by analysts (“reverse tipping”). Third, analysts 
and options traders may independently gather similar information, but options traders can 
exploit this more quickly (“common information”).  
We focus on the analyst initiation events to distinguish between these explanations. Irvine, 
Lipson, and Puckett (2007) argue that analyst initiation is least likely to be related to “reverse 
tipping” because the initiation occurs at very low frequency and it is too costly to respond to 
tips that are contained in institutional trading. The average analyst in our sample only initiates 
coverage for 0.77 firms each year. This number should be much larger if sell-side analysts 
respond to informed traders’ trading activities to issue initial recommendations. Our results 
show that both the IV spread and IV skew are significant predictors of analysts’ initial 
recommendations, which points towards the tipping hypothesis. 
To distinguish the common-information hypothesis from the tipping hypothesis, we 
follow Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010) to examine the relationship between the pre-event 
IV spread/skew and the standardized unexpected earnings (SUEs) in the quarter that precedes 
the analyst initiation. The earnings report is undoubtedly one of the most important 
information sources with which to evaluate a firm’s performance. We sort firms into terciles 
based on the pre-event IV spread/skew. If sell-side analysts and options traders both analyze 
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firms’ most recent quarterly earnings, we expect to see higher (lower) SUEs for firms with 
higher IV spread (IV skew). On the contrary, we find no significant patterns for the SUEs, 
which is inconsistent with the common-information argument. In sum, compared with the 
other two hypotheses, our results are most supportive of the analyst-tipping hypothesis. 
We conduct a series of additional tests to validate our results, where we focus on the 
analyst initiations, as these events are most important for the tipping hypothesis. First, we 
investigate whether the options market liquidity is an important factor driving informed 
traders to the options market. We find that the proportion of options trading predictability on 
stock returns that is associated with the analyst initiation decreases with the bid-ask spreads 
of options, which is in line with the argument by Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) that the 
options market is more attractive to informed traders compared with the stock market when 
options liquidity is high. Moreover, we examine the IV spread and skew in the post-event 
weeks and find that the IV spread and skew revert to their normal levels, suggesting that 
informed traders believe that the market has fully reacted to the event news and therefore 
close their options positions.6 Finally, we cross-sectionally sort firms into decile portfolios 
based on IV spread/skew. We find that the four-factor abnormal returns during the week after 
portfolio formation are larger in magnitude on the days in which analysts initiate their first 
recommendations than in the no-event days. This is consistent with our major finding that 
more informed investors participate in the options market around analyst initiations. 
For robustness purposes, we perform a sub-period analysis using data from 2002 to 2010 
to address the concern of inaccurate analyst report time stamps in I/B/E/S from 1994 to 2001 
6 It is also in line with the notion that informed traders are more likely to be contrarian traders, as argued, for 
example, by Brennan and Cao (1996), Lakonishok and Lee (2001), and Watanabe (2008). 
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and find qualitatively similar results. Last but not least, we assess the influence of the 
short-selling activities of the informed investors.7 Investors who are informed about the 
analyst-related news could also trade in the short-selling market, and the options prices would 
be influenced by the changes in the equity-lending fees through the put-call parity 
relationship. To address this concern, we control for the equity-lending fee in the analyses, 
and our results are not changed.The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
describes the data and provides summary statistics for the analyst-related events and informed 
options trading measures. Section 3 presents the empirical results for the main hypothesis. 
Section 4 discusses three hypotheses of how investors become informed of analyst-related 
news. Section 5 presents three additional tests. Section 6 shows the robustness checks. 
Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Data and summary statistics 
In this section, we describe the data used in the study and discuss the summary statistics for 
the analyst-related events and the informed options trading measures. 
2.1. Data description 
Our sample period covers from January 1996 to December 2010. We use American-style 
options data from OptionMetrics, which is a comprehensive database providing end-of-day 
bid and ask quotes, open interests, trading volumes and other relevant information for all 
options on US exchange listed equities.8 The database calculates the option implied volatility 
7 The empirical results for the robustness tests are non-tabulated for the sake of brevity. They are available upon 
request.  
8 More details can be found in the “Ivy DB's OptionMetrics Manual,” which is available at:  
http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/support/Data/_001Manuals%20and%20Overviews/_105OptionMetrics/IvyDB'
s%20OptionMetrics%20Manual.pdf.cfm.  
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using a proprietary pricing algorithm that is based on the industry-standard 
Cox-Ross-Rubinstein (CRR) binomial tree model (Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979)), which 
accommodates underlying securities with either discrete dividend payments or a continuous 
dividend yield and is widely used for pricing American options.  
For the options data, we employ the following filters following Xing, Zhang, and Zhao 
(2010) to reduce the effects of illiquid options and outliers: i) the volume of the underlying 
stock is positive; ii) the price of the underlying stock is above $5; iii) the implied volatility of 
the option is between 0.03 and 2; iv) the mean of the best bid and best ask prices of the 
options is above $0.125; v) the open interest of the options is positive; vi) the trading volume 
of the options is not missing; and vii) the time to maturity of the options is within 10 to 60 
days. After applying all of the above criteria, we have daily options data for 6,767 distinct US 
listed stocks throughout the whole sample period. 
The events data of the analyst recommendation changes, the analyst forecast revisions, 
and the analyst initiations are extracted from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S). The stock trading data are from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
The general accounting data are provided by the Compustat. 
2.2. Analyst-related events 
The analyst-related events are defined as follows: the analyst recommendation change is the 
total number of notches changed for a stock during a trading day from all individual analysts 
(where an analyst recommendation equals a number from 5 to 1, indicating strong buy, buy, 
hold, underperform, and sell, respectively); the analyst forecast revision is the change of the 
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consensus analyst forecast defined as the mean of the earnings estimates from individual 
analysts; the analyst initiation is the very first recommendation that an analyst gives on a 
stock. If multiple initiations occur for one stock within one trading day, we take the average 
of all of the initial recommendations.9 To adjust for the possible clustering of analyst reports 
around earnings dates, we exclude the analyst-related events that are within the five-day 
window of the quarterly earnings announcement dates.  
[Table 1 to be inserted here] 
Panel A of Table 1 provides summary statistics on the three analyst-related events. In our 
sample, the analyst forecast revision occurs most frequently. For the analyst recommendation 
change and analyst forecast revision, the average events are in negative values, and both are 
quite volatile across the sample. The mean analyst recommendation change is -0.13, while its 
standard deviation is 1.53. The analyst forecast revision has a mean of -0.005, and its 
standard deviation is 0.10. By contrast, the mean value of analysts’ initial recommendations is 
3.82, indicating that the average initial recommendation is better than “hold” and leans 
towards “buy.” 
2.3. Measures of informed options trading 
Based upon the existing literature, we employ two informed options trading measures in this 
paper: the IV spread and the IV skew.  
The IV spread is calculated as described by Cremers and Weinbaum (2010). For stock i  
9 We obtain the analyst initiation sample following Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett (2007). We find the first 
recommendation from an analyst on a stock in the I/B/E/S since December 14, 1992. To address the concern that 
an initiation record could be just a new entry of a brokerage firm into the database, observations are excluded 
from the sample if the brokerage firm appears in the I/B/E/S for less than six months before the initiation. 
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on day t , which has n  pairs of matched call and put options with identical strike prices and 
expiration dates, the IV spread is calculated to be the open-interest weighted average of the 
differences in IVs between the matched call and put options:10 
,
, ,
, , , ,
1
( ),                                               (1)
i tn
i i call i put
i t j t j t j t
j
spread w IV IV
=
= −∑   
The IV spread measures the deviations from put-call parity. For American-style options, 
which allow early exercise, the deviation from put-call parity does not necessarily indicate an 
arbitrage opportunity. In addition, in the case of transaction costs, there is a range of call and 
put prices that precludes arbitrage even for European options. Then, in a market in which 
options are not perfectly liquid, buy or sell pressure may lead to deviations from put-call 
parity that do not reflect an arbitrage opportunity but rather (informed) trading. In the case of 
positive information, call-buying pressure may push call IVs up, above put IVs. In the case of 
negative information, the opposite may occur. If informed traders prefer the options market, 
the IV spread may then predict future stock returns. 
The IV skew is defined as the difference between the IVs of the OTM put options and the 
ATM call options on the same stock (Xing, Zhang, and Zhao (2010)): 
, , , ,                                                    (2)
OTMP ATMC
i t i t i tskew IV IV= −  
A put option is OTM if its moneyness of the strike price to stock price ratio lies between 
0.80 and 0.95. A call option is ATM if its moneyness is between 0.95 and 1.05. In the case of 
more than one record of OTM put or ATM call options for one stock on one day, we choose 
10 We find qualitatively similar results using the options trading volume as the weighting. 
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the put options with the moneyness closest to 0.95 and the call options with the moneyness 
closest to 1. The IV skew thus measures the left shape of the IV function and is found to 
contain negative predictive information for future stock returns. The intuition is again that 
informed traders buy OTM put options to express their negative information.11 Note that 
OTM options provide higher leverage than ATM or in-the-money (ITM) options.  
Panel B of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the IV spread and IV skew. For the full 
sample period of January 1996 to December 2010, we have a total of 7,083,631 IV spreads 
calculated for 6,629 distinct firms and 3,613,595 IV skews for 6,082 firms. Consistent with 
previous studies, the IV spread is negative on average, while the IV skew is positive on 
average. The average daily cross-sectional mean of the IV spread is -1.1%, indicating that put 
options are generally more expensive than the matched call options with the same strike 
prices and maturities. For the IV skew, the average daily cross-sectional mean is 5.5%, 
suggesting that OTM put options are more expensive on average than ATM call options on 
the same stocks. Both the IV spread and the IV skew exhibit substantial variations. The 
average daily cross-sectional standard deviation of the IV spread is 6.4%, and it is 6.6% for 
the IV skew.12 
3. Decomposition of options trading predictability on stock returns 
In this section, we follow the empirical setup used by Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2012) to 
11 Note that the IV skew may also reflect a risk premium for jump risk. This would imply a positive relation 
between the IV skew and subsequent stock returns. The existing research does not find an important role of such 
an effect. 
12 We received a comment from an anonymous referee that the lack of contemporary observations of put and 
call transactions could possibly add errors to the measures of IV spread and IV skew. It is difficult to address 
this issue directly due to data limitations. The OptionMetrics only provides daily aggregated options trading data. 
Nevertheless, this potential measurement error, which adds noise to the estimation, is likely to bias against us to 
find any significant results. Given that our empirical findings are strong and robust, the concern about the 
measurement errors is alleviated. 
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examine whether options traders hold private information on the analyst-related events such 
that their trading activities in the options market can predict future stock returns. Our main 
hypothesis in this section is to test whether options trading has predictive power on future 
excess returns and to what extent the predictability comes from the analyst-related events. 
The detailed empirical setup is outlined in the following subsection. All estimated standard 
errors are clustered by firm and calendar quarter to adjust for the cross-sectional and serial 
correlations in the pooled regression residuals (Petersen (2009)). 13 We provide a brief 
discussion of the two-way clustering methodology in the Appendix. 
3.1. Empirical setup for the hypothesis testing 
The empirical estimations are conducted in three steps. In the first step, we study the stock 
return predictability of IV spread and IV skew. We regress the excess returns on each options 
trading measure and the control variables: 
, , 4 0 1 , 5, 1 52 , 5, 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 , 24, 2
76 , 1 , 5, 1 8 , 1 9 , 5, 1                 
                   
lni t t i t t i t t i y i w i w w
i m i t t i m i t t
exret option
Year fixed ef
size bm ret ret
turnover hskew stockbasp
β β
γ
β β β β
β σ β β β
+ − − − − − − − −
− − − − − −
= + + +
+
+
+ +
+ + +
,                                                                       (3),             i tfects ε+
 
where , , 4i t texret +  is the daily excess stock return, calculated as the stock return in excess of 
the market return averaged over day t  to day 4t + . The variable , 5, 1i t toption − −  refers to the 
informed trading measures constructed from the options market five trading days before the 
event. It can take the value of , 5, 1i t tspread − −  or , 5, 1i t tskew − −  (the average IV spread and 
average IV skew over the pre-event week).14 
13 If we do not include year fixed effects, it is computationally feasible to cluster the standard error by firm and 
week. We find very similar results when clustering the estimated standard errors by firm and week. 
14 We choose the prediction window of five trading days following Cremers and Weinbaum (2010); Xing, Zhang, 
and Zhao (2010); and Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2012). We find qualitatively similar results using a three-day 
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Other explanatory variables controlling for different firm characteristics include the 
average natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization during the previous week 
, 5, 1ln i t tsize − − , the book-to-market ratio by the end of last calendar year , 1i ybm − , the cumulative 
stock return over the previous week , 1i wret − , the cumulative stock return over the past 2 to 24 
weeks ,w 24,w 2iret − − , the stock return volatility in the previous month calculated using daily 
stock returns , 1i mσ − , the average turnover rate for the previous week calculated as the stock 
trading volume over the number of shares outstanding , 5,t 1i tturnover − − , the historical skewness 
of the daily stock returns over the past month , 1i mhskew − , and the average stock bid-ask 
spread over the previous week defined as the closing ask less the closing bid and divided by 
the midpoint , 5, 1i t tstockbasp − − . The year fixed effects are also included in the regressions. 
If the options market leads the stock market, we expect the IV spread to be positively 
correlated with future excess returns, which implies a positive estimated value of 1β . 
Additionally, we anticipate the IV skew to be negatively correlated with future excess returns, 
which indicates a negative 1β . 
In the second step, we add an interaction term between the options trading measure and a 
dummy variable indicating the occurrence of any of the three events to the regression (3): 
, , 4 0 1 2 , , 5, 1 3 , , 1
,
( )
                   ,                                                                       (4)
i t t i t i t t i t i t
i t
exret eventday option eventday controls
Year fixed effects
β β β β δ
γ ε
+ − − −= + + ∗ + +
+ +
 
where ,i teventday  takes the value of 1 if one of the three events takes place for firm i  on day 
t , and 0 otherwise. The , 1i tControls −  are the lagged control variables described in the previous 
subsection.  
prediction window. 
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Therefore, when none of the events takes place, the predictability of options trading on 
future excess returns is measured as 1β . When any of the events occurs, the predictability 
becomes 1 2( )β β+ . Therefore, we decompose the predictability of options trading on stock 
returns into two parts: the days with specified analyst-related events and other days. The 
interacted coefficient 2β  indicates the predictability from the event day such that we can 
calculate the proportion of the predictability that is attributed to informed options traders’ 
private information about the upcoming three types of events. Note that 1 2( )β β+  captures 
the return effect one would obtain from the standard event study.  
In the last step, we replace the ,i teventday  in the previous step by three individual event 
dummy variables to test the hypothesis for each analyst-related event separately: 
, 1
, , ,, , 4 0 1 2 3 4 , 5, 1
, , ,5 76
,                    
( )
                i t
i t i t i ti t t i t t
i t i t i t
i t
initiation
controls
Year fixed effects
exret revision recommend option
revision recommend initiation δ
γ
β β β β β
β β β
ε
−
+ − −
+
+
= + + + + ∗
+ + +
+ ,                                                                         (5)
 
where ,i trecommend  equals 1 if an analyst recommendation change takes place, and 0 
otherwise; ,i trevision  equals 1 if an analyst forecast revision takes place, and 0 otherwise; 
and ,i tinitiation  equals 1 if an analyst initiation takes place for firm i  on day t , and 0 
otherwise.  
By the same argument as in regression (4), the interacted coefficients of 2β , 3β , and 4β  
help us gauge the portion of the predictability that comes from informed options traders’ 
private information for each analyst-related event. In particular, studying initiations is 
important in order to distinguish the various explanations for the predictive results, as 
discussed below in Section 5. 
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3.2. Empirical results for the decomposition of options trading predictability  
Table 2 present the regression results on the main hypothesis for the IV spread. 
[Table 2 to be inserted here] 
The first two columns of Table 2 are for regressions in the first step. The IV spread is 
positively related to future excess returns, with a t-statistic of 10.43 without controls and 
10.04 with control variables. The coefficient estimates indicate that a one standard deviation 
increase in the IV spread would raise the average daily excess return in the following week 
by 2.84 basis points. 
The third and fourth columns of Table 2 report the regression results for the second step. 
When we only include the IV spread, its interaction term and the event dummy variable, the 
IV spread itself carries a significant coefficient of 0.47 (t-statistic = 10.33), and the 
interaction term has a significant coefficient of 0.62 (t-statistic = 3.50). In the fourth column, 
with the inclusion of all the control variables, the coefficient estimate on the IV spread 
becomes 0.42 (t-statistic = 9.56), and the coefficient estimate on the interaction term is 0.66 
(t-statistic = 3.63). Hence, the predictability of the IV spread over excess returns on event 
days is more than double that on non-event days (1.08 vs. 0.42). 
To further compute the exact percentages of the predictability that come from 
analyst-related events, we can follow the analysis by Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2012): 
because event days constitute 4.47% of the whole IV spread sample, the overall predictive 
power of the IV spread can be measured as: 0.42* (1 – 4.47%) + (0.66 + 0.42)* 4.47% = 0.45. 
Therefore, the fraction of the predictability that comes from the informed options traders’ 
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private information about the three events can be calculated as: (0.66 + 0.42)* 4.47% / 0.45 = 
10.74%. 
The last two columns of Table 2 report the results for the last step. After including the 
three interaction terms between the IV spread and each analyst-related news dummy and 
controlling for different firm characteristics and year-fixed effects, the IV spread can still 
positively predict the excess returns with a t-statistic of 9.54. The predictability becomes 
significantly stronger on trading days when analyst-related news takes place. The interaction 
terms with the analyst recommendation dummy, the analyst forecast revision dummy, and the 
analyst initiation dummy carry significant and positive coefficient estimates. As for the event 
dummy, the analyst recommendation change dummy and analyst forecast revision dummy 
carry significantly negative coefficients, while the analyst initiation dummy has a 
significantly positive coefficient. This is because both the analyst recommendation change 
and the analyst forecast revision on average contain negative information, as shown in Table 
1, which leads to negative impacts on excess stock returns. By contrast, analysts’ initial 
recommendations are more likely to be good news for firms.  
Following similar calculations as those in the previous paragraph, because days with 
analyst recommendation changes, analyst forecast revisions, and analyst initiations make up 
1.24%, 2.77%, and 0.85% of the whole IV spread sample, approximately 4.51%, 6.05%, and 
1.76% of the predictability of the IV spread on excess returns can be attributed to informed 
options traders’ private information about the regarded analyst-related event. 
 [Table 3 to be inserted here] 
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We then turn to the IV skew and perform a similar analysis. Table 3 presents the results. 
The first two columns report the regressions in step one. The relation between the IV skew 
and future stock returns is significantly negative. When only including the IV skew, the 
coefficient estimate on it is -0.24, with a t-statistic of -4.44. With firm characteristics 
controlled, the coefficient estimate on the IV skew is -0.24, with a t-statistic of -5.15. A one 
standard deviation increase in the IV skew would decrease the average daily excess return in 
the following week by 1.60 basis points. 
The third and fourth columns of Table 3 provide the results for step two. Without 
controlling for firm characteristics, the coefficient estimate on the IV skew is -0.23 (t-statistic 
= -4.19), and the interacted coefficient is -0.43 (t-statistic = -3.20). After including all control 
variables, the IV skew has a statistically significant coefficient of -0.23, while the interaction 
term carries a significant coefficient of -0.40. The results imply that the predictability of the 
IV skew for stock returns on event days is nearly three times as large as that on non-event 
days (-0.63 vs. -0.23). If we take into account that the event days make up 5.26% of the 
whole IV skew sample, the overall predictive power can be calculated as -0.23* (1 – 5.26%) 
+ (-0.23 + (-0.40))* 5.26% = -0.25. The fraction of the predictability that is associated with 
informed options traders’ private information about the events can be measured as (-0.23 + 
(-0.40))* 5.26% / (-0.25) = 13.20%. 
The last two columns of Table 3 present the results, distinguishing between different types 
of analyst-related events. The interaction coefficient is significantly negative for analyst 
recommendation change and analyst forecast revision. As presented in the last column, the IV 
skew has a significant coefficient of -0.23 (t-statistic = -4.77), and the interaction terms with 
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the analyst recommendation change dummy and analyst forecast revision dummy carry 
significant coefficients of -0.47 (t-statistic = -2.53) and -0.39 (t-statistic = -2.38). Therefore, 
the predictability of the IV skew for stock returns is more than three times larger on days with 
analyst recommendation changes than on other days (-0.70 vs. -0.23) and is more than twice 
as large as when analysts revise their earnings estimates (-0.62 vs. -0.23). Through a similar 
calculation as in the previous step, we found that in the IV skew sample, 1.43% and 3.33% of 
the days include analyst recommendation change and analyst forecast revision, approximately 
4.23% and 8.50% of the return predictability by IV skew are associated with the analyst 
recommendation change and analyst forecast revision. The interaction term between the IV 
skew and the analyst initiation dummy is not statistically significant. It can be attributed to 
the fact that analyst initiations overall tend to be positive news; thus, its impacts on stock 
returns are better captured by the IV spread, which positively predicts stock returns. Our 
results are in line with Hayunga and Lung (2013), who also show that the predictive power of 
options trading on stock returns is stronger when approaching the analyst recommendation 
change days. 
To sum up, we show that options trading activities have significant predictive power over 
future excess returns. What is more important is that we decompose the predictability 
regarding different informational analyst-related events. We find that the predictability of 
options trading on excess returns is significantly related to investors’ private information on 
analyst-related news. 
4. Discussion of the potential information flows between sell-side analysts 
and options traders 
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We show in the previous section that informed options traders have information on 
analyst-related news. The options trading predictability on the stock return is particularly 
strong on days prior to analyst-related events. In this section, we will focus on the event of 
analyst initiation to provide an analysis of the relative merit of three possible explanations 
regarding how options traders become informed about this analyst-related news. 
4.1. Three hypotheses 
The first hypothesis is analyst tipping: Informed traders acquire information from analysts 
before public announcements of the recommendation changes, forecast revisions, or 
initiations. They capitalize on tips by trading in the options market prior to the events such 
that the excess demand pressure in the options market can predict analyst-related news. The 
tipping hypothesis is in line with the studies by Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett (2007) and 
Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010). The former provide evidence that some institutional 
investors receive tips from sell-side analysts with regard to forthcoming analysts’ reports, and 
the latter suggests that some traders are tipped by analysts about upcoming downgrades and 
reveal the tips through short sales. 
The second hypothesis is reverse tipping: Informed options traders tip their recent trading 
activities to the sell-side analysts. In reality, sell-side analysts are usually more junior than 
buy-side analysts and asset managers, who are arguably better informed. Cen, Dasgupta, and 
Ragunathan (2012) show that sell-side analysts benefit from buy-side analysts’ information 
production abilities. If some sell-side analysts ask about the views or recent trading activities 
of informed options traders (e.g., hedge fund managers) to help them write reports, this can 
also lead to the lead-lag relation between options trading and analyst-related news. 
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The third hypothesis, common information, is that informed traders and sell-side analysts 
analyze the same available materials at hand and draw similar conclusions at the same time. 
However, informed investors can trade in the options market immediately, while the sell-side 
analysts need to spend time writing the reports and going through the internal compliance 
process. Our conversations with analysts suggest that the compliance process may take a few 
days, which is consistent with the five-day window of our predictability.  
Note that the three hypotheses may not be mutually exclusive and can exist at the same 
time. In following subsections, we will focus on the event of analyst initiation to examine 
which hypothesis might be the most relevant. As suggested by Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett 
(2007), analyst initiation is less likely to be correlated with the reverse-tipping argument due 
to its high costs and low frequency. Therefore, it provides us with clear tests to distinguish the 
three hypotheses. 
4.2. Analyst tipping vs. reverse tipping 
First, we differentiate the analyst-tipping hypothesis and the reverse-tipping hypothesis 
through examining the predictability of options trading on analysts’ initial recommendations. 
Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett (2007) argue that it is unlikely that analysts initiate coverage on a 
stock in response to a tip received from informed traders. First of all, the initiation of 
coverage is costly and time consuming, and second, the frequency of initiation seems to be 
too low. During our sample period through 1996 to 2010, one analyst issued 0.77 initiations 
each year on average. If sell-side analysts responded to tips from asset managers who trade 
options, the number would be larger.  
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Thus, if the reverse-tipping hypothesis dominates, we may not find any predictability of 
options trading on analysts’ initial recommendations. On the contrary, if the analyst-tipping 
phenomenon prevails, we can still find some predictive power of options trading over analyst 
initiations. We run pooled regressions in the following form: 
1 , 1, ,0 , 5, 1   _ ,         (6)i ti t i ti t t controls Year fixed effectsinitial rec option δ γβ β ε−− − += + + +  
where , ,_ i j tinitial rec  is the initial recommendation issued for stock i  on day t . 
 [Table 4 to be inserted here] 
Table 4 presents the estimation results. Both the IV spread and the IV skew are 
significantly correlated with the analyst’s initial recommendation. The IV spread positively 
predicts analysts’ initial recommendations with a t-statistic of 4.80, while the IV skew 
negatively predicts analyst initiations with a t-statistic of -4.03. The results are more 
consistent with the analyst-tipping hypothesis. 
4.3. Analyst tipping vs. common information 
The previous results are less consistent with the reverse-tipping line of thought. However, it 
could be both consistent with the tipping and common-information hypotheses. In this 
subsection, we distinguish between the analyst-tipping hypothesis and common-information 
hypothesis following Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010). We achieve this purpose by 
studying the relationship between the IV spread/skew and the standardized earnings surprise 
(SUE) preceding the analyst initiations. The SUE is calculated as is the announced earnings 
per share less the corresponding consensus analyst forecast and scaled by the standard 
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deviation of the quarterly earnings estimates. We sort our sample into terciles based on the 
average IV spread and IV skew during the three days prior to the analyst initiations and check 
the pattern of the SUEs of the most recent calendar quarters. 
Under the common-information hypothesis, if both options investors and analysts make 
predictions about the stock performance using the same fundamental information, such as the 
earnings performance, we expect to find a more positive (negative) preceding SUE for stocks 
with higher IV spread (IV skew) before the analyst initiations. On the contrary, we should not 
anticipate this pattern according to the analyst-tipping hypothesis. 
[Table 5 to be inserted here] 
As shown in Table 5, the sorting results are inconsistent with the common-information 
hypothesis. In the case of the IV spread, the mean preceding SUE for the high-minus-low 
tercile is -0.006% (t-statistic = -0.53). As for the IV skew, the mean preceding SUE of the 
high-minus-low tercile is -0.009% (t-statistic = -0.80). The findings are thus more in line with 
the analyst-tipping hypothesis. 
We admit that the analyses used to differentiate the three hypotheses are not perfect. For 
instance, the common information shared by options investors and analysts may not be 
confined to earnings. Nevertheless, our results provide evidence that analyst tipping is most 
relevant for options traders’ private information on future analyst-related events. 
5. Additional tests 
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We perform three additional tests to further support our main hypotheses. First, we examine 
how the options market liquidity would affect our analyses. Second, we study the post-event 
trading strategies of options traders. Finally, we conduct an event-based long/short portfolio 
analysis. 
5.1. Predictability of stock returns and options market liquidity 
Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998) suggest that the options market would be preferred by 
informed traders compared to the stock market when the options liquidity is relatively higher. It 
is thus a natural extension to examine whether our results are stronger when the options market 
is more liquid. To test this conjecture, we use the options bid-ask spread, which is calculated as 
the best ask price less the best bid price and scaled by the midpoint as a proxy for the options 
market illiquidity. 
We focus on the event of analyst initiation to be specific about the tipping channel. We 
add interaction terms of the options bid-ask spread with the informed options trading measure 
and the initiation dummy variable to equation (4): 
, , 4 0 1 2 , 5, 1 , 5, 1 3 4 , 5, 1 , , 5, 1
5 , ,, 1
( ( )
                   ,               
)
  
i t t i t t i t t i t t i t i t t
i t i ti t
exret basp option basp optionsopt opt initiation
initiation controls Year fixed effects
β β β β β
β εδ γ
+ − − − − − − − −
−
= + + ∗
+ +
+ ∗ + ∗
+ +                             (7)
 
where the , 5, 1i t toptbasp − −  is the average bid-ask spread over the previous week. We expect 4β  
to have the opposite sign of 3β , as we anticipate observing less options trading on private 
information about the analyst-related events when the options market is less liquid, that is, 
when options have higher bid-ask spreads.  
 [Table 6 to be inserted here] 
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Table 6 reports the regression results for equation (7). The triple interaction between the 
initiation dummy variable, the options trading measure and the bid-ask spread equals -0.89 
for the IV spread (t-statistic = -1.90) and 1.91 for the IV skew (t-statistic = 3.19); both 
suggest that the predictability of the options trading on future excess returns becomes less 
related to the private information about analysts’ initiations when the options market becomes 
less liquid. 
Overall, consistent with Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998), we find that less informed 
investors choose the options market to capitalize on their private information from analysts 
when the options market liquidity decreases.  
5.2. Options trading measures in the post-event period 
We also examine the trading strategies of options traders after the announcements of 
analyst-related news. If options traders believe that the market has not fully incorporated the 
news into stock prices, they would continue to hold their options positions, and the IV spread 
and IV skew would be expected to remain at their pre-event levels for some time. 
Alternatively, they would choose to liquidate their options, in which case, one would expect 
the IV spread and IV skew to revert. In addition, if the events cause a structural change in 
option risk premiums, one would also expect the IV spread and skew to remain at their 
pre-event levels. By studying the pattern of the IV spread and skew after the events, we 
therefore also check for the possibility that the pre-event option prices simply reflect a change 
in jump or volatility risk premiums. The post-event period options trading is then investigated 
as follows: 
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, 1, 5 0 1 , 2 , 5, 1 , 1 ,  ,  (8)i t t i t i t t i t i toption ret option controls Year fixed effectsβ β β δ γ ε+ + − − −= + + + + +  
where the , 1, 5i t toption + +  is the average of the daily informed options trading measures over 
day 1t +  to day 5t + . It can take the value of , 1, 5i t tspread + +  and , 1, 5i t tskew + + . The variable 
,i tret  is the stock return on the event day.  
The coefficient on the event day return 1β  describes the post-event options trading 
following the event day stock price change. A negative (positive) 1β  for the IV spread (IV 
skew) suggests that informed traders reduce (or even reverse) their positions after event 
announcements. In other words, they believe that the market has fully incorporated the 
analyst-related news. If 1β  is zero, there is no change in the IV spread or skew, consistent with 
the view that informed traders maintain their options positions, as they believe that the 
analyst-related news has not been fully incorporated into the stock price (or that option prices 
have changed structurally due to a change in risk premiums). Finally, a positive (negative) 1β  
for the IV spread (IV skew) suggests that informed traders increase their options positions, 
perhaps because they believe that most of the analyst-related news must still be incorporated 
into the stock price.  
[Table 7 to be inserted here] 
Table 7 provides the regression results. For each analyst-related event, we find negative 
1β  for the IV spread and positive 1β  for the IV skew, all with statistical significance. The 
results indicate that options traders quickly reduce their options positions during the week 
after the release of analyst-related news, and both options trading measures return to their 
normal levels after the stock price changes. These results also support the assumption that 
- 25 - 
 
there are no structural changes in option risk premiums. In addition, our findings are 
consistent with existing literature on information-based trading, which shows that informed 
investors are in aggregate contrarians in the short run.15 
5.3. Event-based long/short portfolio analysis 
In addition, we look at the performance of the long/short portfolios formed on the two options 
trading proxies. Again, we focus on the analyst initiations because they are most informative 
about the tipping channel. We divide our sample into the initiation group with occurrences of 
analysts’ initiations and the non-event group where none of the three analyst-related events 
takes place. For each sub-sample, stocks are sorted into deciles every trading day based on 
the average IV spread or IV skew over the previous week. Abnormal returns with respect to 
the four Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997) factors during post-formation weeks are 
calculated for the long/short portfolios, with long stocks in the highest decile and short stocks 
in the lowest decile: 
1 2 3 4( ) ,         (9)t t t t t t t tHigh Low Rm Rf SMB HML Momentumα β β β β ε− = + − + + + +  
 [Table 8 to be inserted here] 
Table 8 presents abnormal returns for the long/short portfolios in both sub-groups. In the 
value-weighted case, the IV spread hedge portfolio gains a positive daily abnormal return of 
18.70 basis points (t-statistic = 3.39) in the post-formation week on initiation days, and 8.20 
basis points (t-statistic = 7.14) on no-event days. The IV skew hedge portfolio earns a 
negative daily abnormal return of -12.70 basis points (t-statistic = -2.10) for the initiation 
15 See, for example, Brennan and Cao (1996); Lakonishok and Lee (2001); and Watanabe (2008). 
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group, and -5.20 basis points (t-statistic = -4.13) for the non-event group. Hence, stocks with 
high IV spreads (low IV skews) outperform stocks with low IV spreads (high IV skews) and 
more so around analysts’ initiations.16 
6. Robustness checks 
For robustness purposes, we address the influence of the inaccuracy of analyst report time 
stamps and the equity lending fee in this section.  
6.1. Inaccuracy of analyst report time stamps 
Hoechle, Schaub, and Schmid (2013) find that the announcement dates in I/B/E/S are on 
average delayed by about 0.64 trading days in the period spanning from 1994 to 2001.17 
Note that we average the IV spread and skew over the 5 trading days before the event. 
Additionally, we use a 5-day window to calculate stock returns after the event. Hence, we do 
not expect this delay to be a major issue for our analysis. Nevertheless, to alleviate any 
concern that the predictability that we documented is driven by the delayed time stamp of 
I/B/E/S, we conduct a sub-period analysis using data from 2002 to 2010. We find 
qualitatively similar results for our main hypothesis. The results are not reported for brevity 
and are available upon request. 
6.2. Lending fees 
A final robustness check concerns the lending fees associated with shorting stocks. If 
informed investors want to short stocks to capitalize on their private negative information, the 
16 We get qualitatively similar results using equal weighting. 
17  Bradley, Clarke, Lee, and Ornthanalai (2014) also find that the average time stamp delay for 
recommendations is around 2.4 hours for NYSE stocks between 2002 and 2007. The majority occur before the 
market opens. Therefore, this intraday delay would not materially affect our analysis. 
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excess shorting demand may increase lending fees, which in turn affects the price of puts 
(through put-call parity) and the IV skew and spread. Therefore, the predictability of IV 
spread and skew on forthcoming negative analyst-related news is also consistent with the 
notion that informed traders reveal their private negative information through the lending 
market instead of the options market. 
To address this concern, we conduct our main analysis again and control for lending fees. 
We use daily lending market data from Data Explorers and find that our main results still hold 
after controlling for lending fees. The results for this analysis are not reported for brevity and 
are also available upon request. 
7. Conclusion  
Our paper provides evidence that options trading can predict excess stock returns because 
informed investors choose the options market to trade on their private information about 
upcoming analyst-related news, namely the analyst recommendation change, analyst forecast 
revision, and analyst initiation. Using both the IV spread and the IV skew as informed options 
trading measures, we decompose the predictability of options trading on stock returns. We 
find that 10.74% of the predictive power of the IV spread and 13.20% of the predictive power 
of the IV skew come from informed options traders’ private information associated with the 
upcoming analyst-related news. In this way, we find the information sources that lie beneath 
the documented predictive patterns. Our results are most consistent with the analyst-tipping 
hypothesis that some options investors receive tips from analysts about their future reports. 
The results are more pronounced when the options market is more liquid.   
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Appendix: Estimating two-way clustered standard errors 
In OLS regressions, residuals are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) 
to obtain unbiased standard errors. However, regressions using panel data often suffer from 
correlated residuals across firms or across time, leading to biased standard errors and 
t-statistics. Petersen (2009) suggests that the most efficient way to address this concern is to 
double cluster the standard errors along both time and firm dimensions, which simultaneously 
adjusts for the cross-sectional and serial correlations in residuals.  
Consider the following regression with the input panel data covering 1, ,i N=   firms 
and 1, ,t T=   time periods: 
, , , (10)i t i ty ε′ +i,t= x β                                                                
where ,i ty  is the dependent variable, ,i tx  is a 1N ×  vector, and β  is the coefficient 
vector. The error term ,i tε  may exhibit correlations either across firms or across time, 
violating the i.i.d. assumption.  
To ensure unbiased standard errors, the adjusted variance-covariance matrix after the 
double clustering on both time and firm dimensions is estimated to be: 
& ,                                        (11)time firm time firm WhiteAdj V V V V= + −   
where timeV  is the variance-covariance matrix with standard errors clustered by time to allow 
for the cross-sectional correlation in residuals, firmV  is the variance-covariance matrix with 
standard errors clustered by firm to allow for the serial correlation, and WhiteV  is the White 
variance-covariance matrix.18 Petersen (2009) shows that this methodology can substantially 
reduce the bias in standard errors that is caused by the dependence in residuals. 
  
18 See also Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011); and Thompson (2011). 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the analyst-related events and informed options trading 
proxies. The data on analyst-related events are from the I/B/E/S. The options trading data are provided 
by the OptionMetrics. The sample period is from January 1996 to December 2010. Recommendation 
change is the total number of notches changed for a stock. An analyst recommendation equals a 
number from 5 to 1, indicating strong buy, buy, hold, underperform, and sell, respectively. Forecast 
revision is the new analyst consensus less the old one. Initiation is the first recommendation that an 
analyst gives for a certain stock. When multiple analysts initiate coverage for one stock within one 
trading day, we take the average of all of the initial recommendations. For each event, we require that 
all firms included are optioned firms. We exclude analyst-related events that are within five days of 
quarterly earnings announcements. IV spread is the difference in IVs between matched pairs of call 
and put options on the same security with identical strike prices and maturities. IV skew is the 
difference between the IVs of the OTM put option and the ATM call option on the same stock. Firm is 
the number of firms included. Std is the standard deviation across observations. N is the number of 
firm-day observations.  
 Firm 25% Median 75% Mean Std N 
Panel A: Analyst-related events 
Analyst recommendation change 5,591 -1.188 -0.155 1.004 -0.131 1.526 116,302 
Analyst forecast revision 5,486 -0.007 -0.001 0.002 -0.005 0.099 237,808 
Analyst initiation 5,986 3.234 3.787 4.508 3.822 0.863 90,497 
Panel B: IV proxies 
IV spread 6,629 -0.034 -0.009 0.014 -0.011 0.064 7,083,631 
IV skew 6,082 0.021 0.045 0.077 0.055 0.066 3,613,595 
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Table 2: IV spread and excess stock returns 
The table below shows pooled daily regressions of excess returns on the IV spread and its interaction terms with the 
event dummy variables. Excess return is the stock return in excess of the market return averaged over day t to day t+4, 
expressed in percentages. IV spread is averaged over the previous week. Eventday is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the analyst recommendation change, analyst forecast revision, or analyst initiation takes place on day t. Recommend, 
Forecast, and Initiation are dummy variables indicating the occurrences of each event. Size is the natural logarithm of 
the market capitalization. B/M is the book-to-market ratio. Ret (w-1) is the buy-and-hold stock return over the previous 
week. Ret (w-24, w-2) is the buy-and-hold stock return over the previous 2 to 24 weeks. Volatility is the daily equity 
return volatility in the previous month. Turnover is the stock trading volume over the number of shares outstanding. 
Hskew is the historical daily stock return skewness of the previous month. Stock bid-ask spread is the closing bid-ask 
spread of the underlying stock, which is the closing ask less the closing bid and divided by the midpoint. Year FE refers 
to the controlling of the year fixed effects. Estimated standard errors are clustered by firm and calendar quarter. ***, **, 
and * indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 Dependent variable: Excess return 
Intercept 0.015 0.034* 0.015 0.035* 0.016 0.035* 
 (1.40) (1.81) (1.44) (1.84) (1.51) (1.86) 
IV spread 0.486*** 0.443*** 0.468*** 0.424*** 0.467*** 0.421*** 
 (10.43) (10.04) (10.33) (9.56) (10.36) (9.54) 
Eventday*IV spread   0.620*** 0.661***   
   (3.50) (3.63)   
Recommend*IV spread     0.985*** 1.158*** 
     (3.59) (4.16) 
Forecast*IV spread     0.504** 0.527** 
     (2.27) (2.48) 
Initiation* IV spread     0.409* 0.458** 
     (1.81) (2.00) 
Eventday   -0.013 -0.017   
   (-1.15) (-1.39)   
Recommend     -0.053*** -0.052*** 
     (-3.30) (-3.09) 
Forecast     -0.037*** -0.042*** 
     (-2.79) (-3.08) 
Initiation     0.044*** 0.039*** 
     (4.60) (4.33) 
Size  -0.0002  0.0001  0.0005 
  (-0.06)  (0.03)  (0.13) 
B/M  0.0003**  0.0003**  0.0003** 
  (2.32)  (2.29)  (2.26) 
Ret (w-1)  -0.371***  -0.371***  -0.372*** 
  (-3.51)  (-3.50)  (-3.51) 
Ret (w-24, w-2)  0.008  0.008  0.008 
  (0.41)  (0.40)  (0.39) 
Volatility  0.201  0.211  0.220 
  (0.26)  (0.27)  (0.28) 
Turnover  -0.071  -0.063  -0.054 
  (-0.57)  (-0.52)  (-0.44) 
Hskew  0.015***  0.015***  0.015*** 
  (4.99)  (4.98)  (4.97) 
Stock bid-ask spread  -0.006  -0.006  -0.006 
  (-0.55)  (-0.55)  (-0.53) 
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 7,382,894 6,284,049 7,382,894 6,284,049 7,382,894 6,284,049 
Adj R2 (%) 0.03 0.15 0.04 0.16 0.04 0.16 
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Table 3: IV skew and excess stock returns 
This table provides pooled daily regressions of excess stock returns on the IV skew and its interactions with the event 
dummy variables. Excess return is the stock return in excess of the market return averaged over day t to day t+4, 
expressed in percentages. IV skew is the average IV skew over the previous week. Eventday is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the analyst recommendation change, the analyst forecast revision, or the analyst initiation takes place on day t. 
Recommend, Forecast, and Initiation are dummy variables indicating the occurrences for each event. Size is the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization. B/M is the book-to-market ratio. Ret (w-1) is the buy-and-hold stock return 
over the previous week. Ret (w-24, w-2) is the buy-and-hold stock return over the previous 2 to 24 weeks. Volatility is 
the daily equity return volatility in the previous month. Turnover is the stock trading volume over the number of shares 
outstanding. Hskew is the historical daily stock return skewness of the previous month. Stock bid-ask spread is the 
closing bid-ask spread of the underlying stock, which is the closing ask less the closing bid and divided by the midpoint. 
Year FE refers to the controlling of the year fixed effects. Estimated standard errors are clustered by firm and calendar 
quarter. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 Dependent variable: Excess return 
Intercept 0.020** 0.056*** 0.019* 0.056*** 0.020** 0.056*** 
 (1.96) (2.97)  (1.90) 
 
(2.95) (1.96) (2.96) 
IV skew -0.239*** -0.242*** -0.225*** -0.227*** -0.224*** -0.226*** 
 (-4.44) (-5.15) (-4.19) (-4.79) (-4.19) (-4.77) 
Eventday*IV skew   -0.425*** -0.396***   
   (-3.20) (-2.88)   
Recommend*IV skew     -0.447** -0.469** 
     (-2.54) (-2.53) 
Forecast*IV skew     -0.406** -0.389** 
     (-2.43) (-2.38) 
Initiation*IV skew     -0.346* -0.279 
     (-1.79) (-1.33) 
Eventday   0.012 0.008   
   (1.05) (0.76)   
Recommend     -0.043** -0.040** 
     (-2.57) (-2.35) 
Forecast     0.002 -0.002 
     (0.16) (-0.18) 
Initiation     0.058*** 0.053*** 
     (3.74) (3.21) 
Size  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001 
  (-0.50)  (-0.44)  (-0.37) 
B/M  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001 
  (0.81)  (0.79)  (0.77) 
Ret (w-1)  -0.461***  -0.461***  -0.462*** 
  (-4.47)  (-4.46)  (-4.46) 
Ret (w-24, w-2)  0.006  0.005  0.005 
  (0.24)  (0.23)  (0.23) 
Volatility  -0.395  -0.384  -0.376 
  (-0.50)  (-0.48)  (-0.47) 
Turnover  -0.160  -0.156  -0.149 
  (-1.31)  (-1.29)  (-1.24) 
Hskew  0.019***  0.019***  0.019*** 
  (5.53)  (5.52)  (5.51) 
Stock bid-ask spread  -0.009  -0.009  -0.009 
  (-0.64)  (-0.64)  (-0.63) 
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 4,627,618 3,939,823 4,627,618 3,939,823 4,627,618 3,939,823 
Adj R2 (%) 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.17 0.02 0.17 
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Table 4: IV spread/skew and analyst initiations 
This table shows the results of pooled OLS regressions of analysts’ initial recommendations on the IV 
spread/skew. Initial recommendation is the first recommendation issued by an analyst for a stock. An 
analyst recommendation equals a number from 5 to 1, indicating strong buy, buy, hold, underperform, and sell, 
respectively. When multiple analysts initiate coverage for one stock within one trading day, we take the 
average of all of the initial recommendations. Option refers to the IV spread and the IV skew. IV spread is the 
average IV spread over the previous week. IV skew is the average IV skew over the previous week. Size is the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization. B/M is the book-to-market ratio. Ret (w-1) is the 
buy-and-hold stock return over the previous week. Ret (w-24, w-2) is the buy-and-hold stock return over the 
previous 2 to 24 weeks. Volatility is the daily equity return volatility for the previous month. Turnover is the 
stock trading volume over the number of shares outstanding. Hskew is the historical daily stock return 
skewness of the previous month. Stock bid-ask spread is the closing bid-ask spread of the underlying stock, 
which is the closing ask less the closing bid and divided by the midpoint. Year FE refers to the controlling of 
the year fixed effects. Estimated standard errors are clustered by firm and calendar quarter. ***, **, and * 
indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 Dependent variable: Initial recommendation 
 IV spread IV skew 
Intercept 3.781*** 3.782*** 3.837*** 3.780*** 
 (137.50) (93.11) (118.16) (86.25) 
Option 0.315* 0.674*** -0.739*** -0.428*** 
 (1.64) (4.80) (-4.70) (-4.03) 
Size  -0.037***  -0.033*** 
  (-7.05)  (-5.41) 
B/M  -0.002  -0.002 
  (-1.46)  (-1.63) 
Ret (w-1)  0.320***  0.289*** 
  (4.06)  (3.51) 
Ret (w-24, w-2)  0.121***  0.089*** 
  (5.83)  (5.09) 
Volatility  -0.358  -0.238 
  (-0.62)  (-0.41) 
Turnover  -0.493*  -0.532** 
  (-1.77)  (-2.28) 
Hskew  0.003  -0.003 
  (0.58)  (-0.44) 
Stock bid-ask spread  -0.023**  -0.002 
  (-2.13)  (-0.13) 
Year FE No Yes No Yes 
N 50,547 43,872 35,199 30,885 
Adj R2 (%) 0.02 5.33 0.25 5.84 
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Table 5: IV spread/skew and earnings performance 
This table displays the mean of earnings performance for sub-samples categorized by the IV spread 
and the IV skew. For each analyst’s initial recommendation, stocks are sorted into terciles based on 
the average IV spread or IV skew over three days prior to the events. High refers to the top tercile 
with the highest IV spread/skew, and Low is the bottom tercile with the lowest IV spread/skew. SUE 
is the standardized unexpected earnings, which is calculated as the announced quarterly EPS less the 
corresponding consensus analyst forecast and scaled by the standard deviation of the quarterly 
earnings estimates. Preceding SUE is the mean of the SUEs in the quarter that precedes the analyst 
initiation. N is the number of events for each tercile. The column High-Low reports the difference in 
the mean of Preceding SUEs between high and low IV spread/skew sub-samples. 
 IV proxy quintiles 
 
  High Median Low High-Low 
Panel A: IV spread 
Analyst initiation 
Preceding SUE 0.039% 0.059% 0.045% -0.006% 
t-stat (5.15) (9.30) (4.78) (-0.53) 
N 10,503 10,504 10,503  
 
Panel B: IV skew 
 Preceding SUE 0.054% 0.072% 0.063% -0.009% 
Analyst initiation t-stat (5.71) (10.50) (10.53) (-0.80) 
 N 7,163 7,164 7,164  
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Table 6: Options market liquidity and stock return predictability 
This table shows the effects of option bid-ask spread as a proxy for the options market illiquidity. Excess return is 
the stock return in excess of the market return averaged over day t to day t+4, expressed in percentages. Option 
refers to the IV spread and the IV skew. IV spread is the average IV spread over the previous week. IV skew is the 
average IV skew over the previous week. Initiation is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the analyst initiation takes 
place on day t. Optbasp is the option bid-ask spread, calculated as the best offer price less the best bid price scaled 
by the midpoint, averaged over the previous week. Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization. 
B/M is the book-to-market ratio. Ret (w-1) is the buy-and-hold stock return over the previous week. Ret (w-24, w-2) 
is the buy-and-hold stock return over the previous 2 to 24 weeks. Volatility is the daily equity return volatility for 
the previous month. Turnover is the stock trading volume over the number of shares outstanding. Hskew is the 
historical daily stock return skewness of the previous month. Stock bid-ask spread is the closing bid-ask spread of 
the underlying stock, which is the closing ask less the closing bid and divided by the midpoint. Year FE refers to 
the controlling of the year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm and calendar quarter. ***, **, and * 
indicate that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 Dependent variable: Excess return 
 IV spread IV skew 
Intercept 0.016 0.034* 0.024** 0.055*** 
 (1.47) (1.78) (2.42) (2.95) 
Option 0.718*** 0.657*** -0.429*** -0.414*** 
 (8.98) (8.72) (-4.37) (-4.99) 
Option*Optbasp -0.447*** -0.417*** 0.242*** 0.225*** 
 (-5.77) (-5.43) (3.11) (3.38) 
Initiation*Option 0.856** 0.897** -1.153*** -1.050*** 
 (2.20) (2.16) (-3.40) (-2.87) 
Initiation*Option*Optbasp -0.960** -0.886* 1.299*** 1.191*** 
 (-2.25) (-1.90) (3.75) (3.19) 
Initiation 0.040*** 0.036*** 0.073*** 0.067*** 
 (3.95) (3.64) (4.74) (4.03) 
Size  -0.0001  -0.001 
  (-0.03)  (-0.25) 
B/M  0.0003**  0.0001 
  (2.29)  (0.76) 
Ret (w-1)  -0.366***  -0.459*** 
  (-3.47)  (-4.46) 
Ret (w-24, w-2)  0.009  0.005 
  (0.43)  (0.21) 
Volatility  0.221  -0.312 
  (0.29)  (-0.39) 
Turnover  -0.060  -0.136 
  (-0.49)  (-1.12) 
Hskew  0.015***  0.019*** 
  (4.96)  (5.47) 
Stock bid-ask spread  -0.006  -0.009 
  (-0.55)  (-0.63) 
Year FE No Yes No Yes 
N 7,380,914 6,282,721 4,626,611 3,939,198 
Adj R2 (%) 0.04 0.16 0.03 0.17 
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Table 7: IV spread/skew in post-event period 
The table below provides pooled OLS regressions of the post-event options trading proxies on the event day 
stock returns. Regressions are conducted for sub-samples of three types of events separately. Post-proxy takes 
the value of post-spread/post-skew, which is the average IV spread/skew over the post-event week, expressed 
in percentages. Pre-proxy takes the value of the average IV spread/skew over the pre-event week, expressed in 
percentages. Ret (t=0) is the stock return on the event day. Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market 
capitalization. B/M is the book-to-market ratio. Ret (w-1) is the buy-and-hold stock return over the previous 
week. Ret (w-24, w-2) is the buy-and-hold stock return over the previous 2 to 24 weeks. Volatility is the daily 
equity return volatility for the previous month. Turnover is the stock trading volume over the number of shares 
outstanding. Hskew is the historical daily stock return skewness of the previous month. Stock bid-ask spread 
is the closing bid-ask spread of the underlying stock, which is the closing ask less the closing bid and divided 
by the midpoint. Year FE refers to the controlling of the year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by 
firm and calendar quarter. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively.  
 Dependent variable: Post-proxy 
 Recommendation change Forecast revision Analyst initiation 
 IV spread IV skew IV spread IV skew IV spread IV skew 
Intercept -1.601*** 8.229*** -1.378*** 9.133*** -0.176** 2.852*** 
 (-4.29) (12.15) (-3.80) (13.90) (-2.07) (14.60) 
Ret (t=0) -3.612*** 1.829*** -2.892*** 0.980* -5.356*** 2.070** 
 (-5.47) (2.67) (-3.59) (1.66) (-7.61) (1.98) 
Pre-proxy 0.475*** 0.526*** 0.485*** 0.516*** 0.464*** 0.523*** 
 (19.71) (26.14) (27.32) (22.21) (14.23) (23.87) 
Size 0.066*** -0.272*** 0.060*** -0.314*** 0.053*** -0.282*** 
 (3.99) (-9.88) (3.77) (-11.54) (3.12) (-8.84) 
B/M 0.002 -0.008 -0.010 0.031 0.005** 0.009 
 (0.56) (-1.10) (-0.80) (1.14) (2.33) (0.54) 
Ret (w-1) -0.046 -1.535 1.228 -3.367*** 0.872 -0.714 
 (-0.06) (-1.60) (1.05) (-4.19) (0.82) (-1.03) 
Ret (w-24, w-2) -0.121* -0.405*** -0.083* -0.494*** -0.087 -0.438*** 
 (-1.93) (-4.29) (-1.81) (-4.92) (-1.52) (-4.32) 
Volatility -8.730** 15.584*** -11.837*** 19.777*** -11.413*** 9.361** 
 (-2.51) (3.16) (-2.94) (4.13) (-3.37) (2.43) 
Turnover 1.059 -1.467 1.516 -8.877*** 0.734 -4.838*** 
 (0.64) (-0.53) (0.63) (-3.19) (0.57) (-3.76) 
Hskew -0.087** 0.122*** -0.125*** 0.047 -0.052* -0.022 
 (-2.46) (3.17) (-3.06) (1.44) (-1.91) (-0.56) 
Stock bid-ask spread -0.034 0.184** 0.015 0.125* -0.034 0.137* 
 (-0.98) (2.49) (0.38) (1.74) (-0.71) (1.87) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 70,487 46,583 156,018 108,690 42,672 27,830 
Adj R2 (%) 22.40 30.13 24.23 31.97 23.06 30.15 
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Table 8: Four-factor analysis on long/short portfolios 
This table displays the four-factor abnormal returns for long/short portfolios formed by sorting on the 
IV spread and IV skew. We divide the whole sample into an initiation group and a non-event group 
based on occurrences of analyst initiations. For each sub-sample, stocks are sorted into decile 
portfolios every trading day based on the average IV spread or IV skew over the previous week. 
Abnormal returns during the post-formation week with regard to the four Fama-French (1993) and 
Carhart (1997) factors are calculated for the value-weighted long/short portfolios, which long stocks 
in the top decile and short in the bottom decile. Alpha is the four-factor abnormal return obtained, 
expressed in percentages. Rm – Rf, SMB, HML, and Momentum are the four factors of the market 
excess return, the small-minus-big, the high-minus-low, and the momentum. The Newey-West (1987) 
t-statistics are computed to adjust for the autocorrelations. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient 
estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: High - low 
 IV spread IV skew 
 Initiation No-event Initiation No-event 
Alpha 0.187*** 0.082*** -0.127*** -0.052*** 
 (3.39) (7.14) (-2.10) (-4.13) 
Rm – Rf 0.056 -0.011 0.051 -0.007 
 (1.47) (-1.52) (0.99) (-0.91) 
SMB -0.179* -0.013 0.094 0.022 
 (-1.76) (-0.82) (0.97) (1.39) 
HML -0.001 -0.027** 0.151 0.080*** 
 (-0.01) (-2.12) (1.29) (4.52) 
Momentum -0.044 -0.038*** 0.049 -0.075*** 
 (-0.76) (-3.12) (0.71) (-5.94) 
N 1,777 3,774 1,342 3,774 
Adj R2 (%) 0.27 0.87 0.32 0.53 
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